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Abstract
This paper summarizes state unemployment insurance job search policies based on a recent
survey of states by the National Association of State Workforce Agencies.  It then reviews research
results on the effects of reemployment services on durations of insured unemployment.  The paper
documents how state administrative practices have changed and questions whether these changes
may have affected monitoring of claimant compliance with work search requirements.  Since state
policies on job search and service referral can affect insured durations of unemployment, these
policies can also affect the measured total unemployment rate. 
 
This paper reflects the opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the positions
or viewpoints of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research or the U.S. Department of
Labor.
1  The National Association of State Workforce Agencies (NASWA) conducted a survey of state unemployment
insurance job search policies in 2003.  They received responses from all 50 states and two other jurisdictions, the District
of Columbia and Puerto Rico; the survey did not include the Virgin Islands, which also has an unemployment insurance
program.  All 53 of these jurisdictions will be called “states” in this article.  The full report on this survey is Christopher
J. O’Leary.  2004.  “UI Work Search Rules and Their Effect on Employment,” prepared for the Center for Employment
Security Education and Research. Washington, DC: NASWA (February). <http://www.workforceatm.org/sections/pdf/
2004/UI_Work_Search.pdf>. Accessed April 22, 2005.  
2Entitled duration of regular benefits can be as long as 30 weeks in both Massachusetts and Washington state
depending on recent employment and earnings.
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I. BACKGROUND
Ever since the federal–state unemployment insurance (UI) system was implemented
following enactment of the Social Security Act in 1935, reemployment of claimants has been an
important emphasis of the program.  This paper examines whether UI requirements for job search
and mechanisms connecting UI claimants with reemployment services tend to shorten insured
unemployment durations.  We summarize evidence from a 2003 survey of all state UI programs
conducted by the National Association of State Workforce Agencies (NASWA).1  We also present
existing research evidence about the effect of job search policies and interventions on the duration
of insured unemployment.  While the size of the estimated impacts differ, the consistent finding is
that both UI work search requirements and reemployment services tend to shorten insured
unemployment durations by speeding return to work.
There is significant variation across the states in many aspects of UI program design.  All
state UI programs provide partial wage replacement to eligible claimants for a period up to six
months to workers who become unemployed through no fault of their own.2  State rules establish
initial eligibility conditions defining acceptable conditions for job separation and the degree of prior
labor force attachment.  Workers who quit their jobs or who were justly dismissed for cause are
normally denied initial eligibility for benefits.  To continue collecting jobless compensation, UI
claimants who do initially qualify for benefits must demonstrate on a week-to-week basis that they
3The consensus estimate is that a 10 percent increase in the wage replacement rate provided by UI would
increase the insured duration of joblessness by about one week.  For a summary of research on this issue see Paul T.
Decker.  1997.  “Work Incentives and Disincentives,” in Unemployment Insurance in the United States: Analysis of
Policy Issues, Christopher J. O’Leary and Stephen A. Wandner, editors.  Kalamazoo MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research, pp. 285-320.    
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are able and available for work and are actively seeking a job.  State rules requiring job search by
UI claimants are commonly called the “UI work test.”
UI as social insurance includes elements common to both private insurance and social
welfare.  For the risk of unemployment to be insurable, the loss of employment must be an
unavoidable event.  To maintain the insurance character of the UI program, workers who voluntarily
separate from employment are denied initial eligibility for cash benefits.  Monitoring to ensure that
job separations were involuntary and an active search for work is pursued reduces a potential
insurance problem of “moral hazard,” wherein the insured person controls the risk of exposure to
occurrence of the event insured against.
UI is a national program operated by the states under federal administrative requirements.
The UI program pays benefits to a substantial minority of unemployed workers, and benefits are
large enough to have an effect on their reemployment behavior.3  For fiscal year 2006, it is expected
that 9 million beneficiaries will collect over $37 billion in benefits, with an average duration of more
than 15 weeks.  Both the statutory rules requiring an active job search and the provision of
reemployment services can have a significant effect on the length of compensated duration.  Since
typically 40 percent of jobless workers qualify for UI compensation, measures to reduce insured
durations of unemployment can also significantly reduce the population estimate of unemployment
as measured by the Current Population Survey.
UI administrative procedures also have an impact on the pace at which UI beneficiaries
return to work.  Some of these procedures have changed dramatically over the past decade.  During
4 See Wayne Vroman and Stephen Woodbury.  2004.   “Trend and Cycle of Unemployment Insurance and the
Employment Service,” paper presented at Workforce Innovations 2005, Research Showcase, hosted by the Office of
Policy Development and Research, Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labaor, Philadelphia,
PA, July 11–13, 2005.
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that time states have dramatically increased the extent to which they take initial and continued
claims over the telephone and through the Internet.  The switch from one-on-one in person claims
taking in employment security offices reduces the chance that UI claimants will be quickly involved
in reemployment services at one-stop centers.  Additionally, the number of states that systematically
review work search activity and refer UI claimants to reemployment services through eligibility
review programs (ERPs) has declined over time.
Two institutional changes have operated to counter the distancing from reemployment
services resulting from technological change in claims administration.  The Worker Profiling and
Reemployment Services (WPRS) system, established by a 1993 federal law, requires states to refer
UI claimants at risk of long-term joblessness to mandatory reemployment services.  The Workforce
Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 established one-stop centers that provide universal access to core and
intensive reemployment services.  
Labor market conditions have also changed substantially in the last decade.  Workers who
are designated by their separating employer as likely to be recalled to work are usually excused from
the work search requirement, and they are not referred to reemployment services.  However, the
proportion of UI claimants who are on permanent layoff has increased dramatically, while the share
on temporary layoff expecting recall has diminished.  The proportion of permanent layoffs among
the insured unemployed has increased from 0.451 in the 1970s to 0.489 in the 1990s, while the
proportion on temporary layoff has declined from 0.141in the 1970s to 0.138 in the 1990s.4  Since
2001 the majority of unemployed job losers have been permanently separated from their prior
4employers.  This fact partly explains why UI claimants now have longer unemployment durations.
It also increases the potential benefit of work search requirements and reemployment services to get
UI beneficiaries back to work more quickly.
II. JOB SEARCH RULES AND REEMPLOYMENT SERVICES
The 2003 NASWA survey of state employment security agencies covered the following
seven topics: 1) the current method of taking initial and continued UI claims, 2) the method of
administering the UI work test, 3) the requirements for demonstrating an active job search, 4)
reasons UI claimants are excused from the work search requirement, 5) the requirements for job
search contacts with employers, 6) the method of validating active work search and identifying cases
where suitable work is refused, and 7) the method of connecting UI beneficiaries with reemployment
services.  We will examine each in turn. 
Throughout the history of the UI program, there has been a strong focus on reemployment.
The UI work test has been a critical component of the reemployment process.  The work test
normally requires both initial job registration with the public employment service and ongoing
weekly job search contacts with potential employers.  The work test depends upon a series of rules
that are embodied in state laws and administrative rules, and the methods and technology used to
take UI claims.
The operational aspects of state UI work search requirements have changed dramatically in
the last decade, in response to a sea change in the way UI claims are taken.  Until recently, most new
initial claims were taken one-on-one in person at employment security offices, with some mass
applications made by employers on behalf of workers when a large number of workers were laid off
5 Colorado was the first state to switch from in-person to telephone claims taking, beginning in April 1991.
The U.S. Department of Labor did not decide to support such automated claims taking in until June 1995 when it issued
a policy position: “...the Department believes that [state employment security agencies] SESAs should move toward fully
implementing telephone claims taking or other electronic methods of filing...”  See Unemployment Insurance Program
Letter 35-95.  The Department began awarding grants for converting to telephone claims in 1996 and to Internet claims
in 1998.
6 <http://www.itsc.org/info_tech/infotech.asp>  Accessed December 13, 2004.
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at one time.  Continued claims for weekly benefits were usually submitted by mail; however, some
states required continued claims to be filed in person at local offices.  Certification of required job
search activity was required in writing.  By contrast, today, in most states new UI claims are taken
over the telephone or the Internet.  Furthermore, the most common mechanism for continued claim
certification is by using automated touch tone telephone systems.  Using these systems, claimants
indicate that they met the job search requirement for contacting employers in the past week or two
by pressing a telephone button.5
The claims taking process describes how claimants interact with the UI administering agency
in each state.  UI claimants now have little contact with staff at the one-stop centers.  A large-scale
movement to telephone claims taking began in the mid-1990s and to Internet claims taking in the
late 1990s.  Today the transition is nearly complete for telephone claims taking: 40 states take initial
claims over the telephone, 10 are planning or implementing, and only 3 have no plans.  For
continued claims, 47 states use telephone systems, 5 are planning or implementing phone systems,
and only 1 state has no plans to move in that direction.  Because of a later start and newer
technology, Internet claims taking is less widespread: 37 states accept initial UI claims over the
Internet, 13 are planning or implementing, and 3 have no plans.  For continued claims, 29 states are
taking claims by Internet, 18 are planning or implementing, and 6 states have no plans (see Table
1).6
7 See Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws 2004, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor,
pp. 5-20,  5-23.
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Once initially eligible, to continue collecting weekly UI benefits claimants must be able,
available, and actively seeking work.  In practice, being able to work is demonstrated in most cases
by the filing of a UI claim and registration for work with the public employment service (PES).  In
the past, claims takers could make an assessment of ability to work when they met with a claimant
face-to-face.  The same can not be done today with telephone or Internet claims.  Availability for
work means being ready, willing, and able to work.  Registration for job search at the public
employment service also provides some evidence of work availability.  
The requirement for actively seeking work calls for action beyond job search registration.
All states except Pennsylvania, require by statute or administrative rule that claimants be seeking
work or making a reasonable effort to find work.  Pennsylvania only requires that workers be able
and available for suitable work.  Ten states require active seeking of work by administrative rule
only: Alaska, Arizona, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Puerto Rico, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Texas.7
Most states require initial registration for job search with the PES and then regular use of job
search services, including participation in job interviews with employers based on job referrals made
by the PES to what is considered to be suitable work.  Forty states require continuous, active job
search, while 12 states do not.  Even among the states that do require continuous search for work,
this requirement is waived under certain circumstances.  The survey reveals that the most common
reasons for waiving occur when the UI claimant is employer-attached and awaiting recall to a prior
job with a definite recall date, a union hiring hall member, or a participant in training approved by
the employment security agency commissioner.  
7Nearly all states waive the work search requirement for workers on temporary layoff with
a definite recall date in the near future.  Some states specify how soon the recall date must be to
waive the requirement.  This waiver has been an essential part of the UI program since it was
established in 1935, allowing employers to retain their skilled workers during short layoffs, until
demand for the firms’ products returns and the workers can be rehired.  Thus, UI is not intended to
break, but rather to preserve, existing employer-worker relationships.
Workers who find their jobs through union hiring halls are also commonly excluded from
the work search requirement.  These workers are not expected to search for work independently as
long as they are registered with the placement service of their union hiring hall.
Workers are also excluded from the work search requirement for weeks during which they
are enrolled in training approved by the state UI agency.  States are required by federal UI law to
have an exemption from the work search requirement for training in their state UI law, as a way to
encourage participation in training.
Taken together, the exemptions for participation in training and for seeking work through
union hiring halls affect only a small fraction of UI beneficiaries.  The exemption for having a
definite recall date affects a much greater share of claimants, but it appears to be declining in
importance in recent decades as more workers losing their jobs are on permanent layoff and smaller
proportions are subject to recall.   
State UI programs can assure continuous search for work by instituting formal requirements
for making contacts with potential employers each week.  States have moved away from strict
numerical requirements for contacts; only about 30 percent of states require one or more contacts
per week.  This decline is in part because employers do not want repetitive and burdensome
8 Burman Skrable.  1997.  “Fraud, Abuse, and Errors in the Unemployment Insurance System,” in
Unemployment Insurance in the United States: Analysis of Policy Issues, Christopher J. O’Leary and Stephen A.
Wandner, editors.  Kalamazoo MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, p. 449.   
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employment applications that are filed, in part, to meet the UI work search requirements.  However,
more vague requirements make it more difficult to assess whether the state is enforcing this
requirement under the UI quality control program.8  Instead of a fixed number of employer contacts,
the most common rule now is to make a number of employer contacts each week that is “customary
for the occupation.”  Such a standard is difficult to enforce.  Another common form of the rule
requires “reasonable and diligent” job search.  Several states allow the number of contacts required
to be customized “as directed.” Less than 20 states still require a fixed number of employer contacts
per week.  For example, Arkansas requires between two and five contacts, while Iowa requires two
per week.  Most states that set a fixed number of contacts require only a single employer contact
each week.  
Making employer contacts a condition for continued UI eligibility does not necessarily mean
that contacts are in fact made.  States have methods for validation of required contacts.  Some states
require that claimants keep a log of their contacts, which must be submitted upon request to the UI
agency.  Others require a written declaration on a signed continued claims form, which is submitted
to the agency.  A few states responding to the NASWA survey indicated that a state eligibility
review program (ERP) assures continuous search.  A state ERP sets a standard schedule for
continuing UI claimants to visit the employment security agency in person to review personal efforts
toward reemployment.  Some states mentioned that their benefits quality control (BQC) audits were
a means of validating compliance with the rules.  However, less than a dozen states have ERPs, and
the BQC program only audits about 500 claims per year in each state.
9On the positive side, all states offer job search assistance (JSA) to UI claimants.  The most
common form of JSA cited by respondents to the NASWA survey was indicated as that offered in
conjunction with workshops offered as part of  the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services
(WPRS) process.  WPRS identifies dislocated workers who are most likely to exhaust their
entitlement to UI benefits, and quickly refers them to reemployment services.  Another source of
JSA identified in responses to the NASWA questionnaire was WIA “core” services provided to
workers at one-stop career centers, including labor market information, job referrals, resume
preparation assistance, and interviewing skills training.  
The only two systematic approaches to promoting reemployment mentioned in state
responses to the survey were WPRS and ERP.  Given that WPRS serves a small portion of UI
claimants and ERPs are only provided in a small number of states, the systematic connection of UI
beneficiaries with job search assistance is rather weak.  That being said, a considerable portion of
UI beneficiaries receive reemployment services in the form of core and “intensive” services in one-
stop career centers, whether because they seek services on their own or because they register with
the public employment service.  The extent of the receipt of reemployment services is explored in
the next section.
III. USE OF CORE AND INTENSIVE SERVICES BY UI CLAIMANTS
A sizeable share of  UI claimants receive some reemployment services from the workforce
development system’s one-stop centers.  For example, during program year (PY) 1999, across the
United States, PES had 16.7 million registrants, of whom 6.2 million were UI claimants.  Of the 6.2
million UI claimants who registered with the PES, 55.4 percent received some reportable service.
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Among those receiving services the most popular were referral to a job interview (48 percent) and
JSA (71 percent).  The observed usage rate for JSA is enhanced by the compulsory participation for
WPRS referrals.  Other core and intensive services are also popular; however, only 3.6 percent of
PES registrants and 5.1 percent of UI beneficiaries were referred to job skills training (see Table 2).
Viewed another way, a substantial minority of UI claimants receive some reportable PES services.
Among the 6.72 million UI beneficiaries in PY 1999, a majority received a reportable service.
The usage of reemployment services by UI beneficiaries can be better appreciated by
examining the specific types of services received.  Tables 3 and 4 provide information about the core
and intensive services that were provided by the Georgia Department of Labor during PY 2000.  Of
the 254,030 total Georgia UI clients that year, 75 percent (190,705) received at least one core
service.  The most frequently provided core services were specific labor market information, help
searching for a job order, and referral to a job interview.
Many fewer Georgia UI clients received intensive services:  56,340, or 22 percent of all
clients.  The most frequently provided of these services were counseling and development of
customer service plans; each of these services were provided to nearly one-fifth of UI clients.  No
other intensive services were provided to more than 2 percent of UI clients.  As shown in Table 4,
the share of UI beneficiaries referred to training was just over 3 percent.
IV. EFFECTS OF RULES AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES ON INSURED
UNEMPLOYMENT DURATIONS
The reemployment services most frequently provided to UI clients are job interview referrals
and JSA.  This section examines evidence on the effectiveness of  reemployment services and work
search requirements in promoting return to work.  Evaluations of job search services for UI
9 See the two early studies evaluated the effectiveness of counseling provided by the public labor exchange.
Benus, Jacob, Arden Hall, Patty Gwartney-Gibbs, Marilyn Coon, Caren Cole, Diane Leeds, and Douglas Brent.  1977.
 “The Effectiveness of Counseling in the U.S. Employment Service: A Pilot Study,” report prepared for U.S. Department
of Labor.  Johnson, Terry R., C. Eric Muson, Samuel Weiner, Asi Cohen, Marilyn L Coon, and Susan E. McNicoll. 
1981.  “Findings from a Survey of the U.S. Employment Service Counseling Program,” Report prepared for the U.S.
Department of Labor.  Both studies found “no significant impact of counseling on duration of unemployment, earnings
or job satisfaction” (Balducchi, David, Terry R. Johnson, and R. Mark Gritz. 1997.  “The Role of the Employment
Service,” in Unemployment Insurance in the United States: Analysis of Policy Issues, Christopher J. O’Leary and
Stephen A. Wandner, editors.  Kalamazoo, MI: Upjohn Institute for Employment Research,  p. 485).
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claimants have focused on three main topics: job interview referrals, JSA, and targeted JSA.9 The
major studies on each of these three topics are summarized separately in Tables 5, 6, and 7.  Each
of the evaluations used a distinct research design, and some satisfied higher methodological
standards than others.  Impact estimates differ across the studies because of varieties  of
methodologies, samples, and time frames used for analysis.  Nonetheless, each of the studies adds
to our knowledge about the effectiveness of public labor exchange services in the United States.
Taken together, evidence from these studies has helped shape the direction of policy
regarding both the UI work test and the public labor exchange in the United States.  Research has
guided the development of programs for dislocated workers, targeted job search assistance, and
institutions for coordination of services. These include the establishment of the WPRS system, one-
stop career centers, and state ERPs as part of the UI work test that is administered by UI and one-
stop career center staff. 
The estimated effects of job interview referrals are summarized in Table 5.  Johnson et al.
(1993), in the first national evaluation of the PES in the United States, found that job referrals are
most effective for women but are also effective for men over 45 years of age and men in urban
areas—providing evidence for delivering job placement services to middle-aged, dislocated workers
(Johnson et al. 1983; Johnson, Dickinson, and West  1985).
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A study by Arnold Katz (1991) of PES effectiveness for dislocated workers in Pennsylvania
found JSA to be most effective early in a spell of joblessness. The study also found that PES job
referrals act as a backstop once job seekers exhaust other avenues of search—evidence that would
favor early JSA intervention to dislocated workers—a policy embodied in the WPRS system.  
An evaluation by Jacobson and Petta (2000) in Washington and Oregon found ES job
placements most effective for those with a strong record of job attachment—providing evidence for
JSA as an intervention for dislocated workers.  A 2003 study by the same authors found similar
results in North Carolina.
Table 6 summarizes evidence from evaluations of JSA.   Field studies in South Carolina and
Maryland by Corson, Long, and Nicholson (1985) and by Klepinger et al. (1998) found that a
stronger UI work test, achieved by requiring reporting of job search contacts and validation of
contacts through cooperation between UI and the PES, leads to significantly shorter periods of
compensated joblessness.  This offers evidence of the importance of an objective and verified job
search requirement. 
A field experiment in Tacoma, Washington, reported on by Johnson and Klepinger (1991,
1994), found that eliminating both continued-claim filing and the work test leads to dramatically
longer spells of compensated joblessness—providing further examples of the importance of UI and
PES cooperation in requiring and monitoring job search activity (Johnson and Klepinger 1991,
1994). This study also evaluated JSA and found shorter unemployment durations for those referred
to JSA. However, because in most cases UI benefit receipt ended just before JSA was scheduled,
the authors speculate that the shorter durations resulted from an effort to avoid the hassle of JSA
rather than as a result of the valuable content of JSA services.  
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In the United Kingdom (UK), UI is administered by their PES and has a uniform initial
entitlement duration of 12 months.  In 1987, a new program called Restart was introduced
nationally. Under Restart, UI beneficiaries nearing six continuous months of benefit receipt were
called in for an appointment at their local PES office and were provided with an intensive package
of JSA.  
An evaluation by Dolton and O’Neill (1996) of the UK Restart program estimated short-term
effects similar to those observed by Johnson and Klepinger (1994) in the Tacoma alternative work-
search experiment. Both evaluations suggested that there was a modest shortening in the duration
of compensated unemployment, and that the invitation for intensive JSA acted more as a prod than
as a support for reemployment. 
Dolton and O’Neill (2002) conducted a subsequent random assignment field experiment,
wherein the treatment group received the standard Restart services when nearing six continuous
months of claiming UI, while the randomly selected control group was given the UK’s Restart
services when approaching 12 continuous months of receiving UI benefits. They found evidence that
over the short term required JSA prodded both groups of UI beneficiaries to go back to work, but
that over a longer five-year term the group getting JSA support earlier in their jobless spell had
measurably higher earnings—a finding that JSA can have valuable content for job seekers.  
Evidence from evaluations in Maryland; Washington, DC; and Florida suggests that
standardized UI eligibility reviews and JSA are relatively inexpensive to administer and can have
a significant effect on reducing periods of compensated joblessness.  They therefore tend to be cost-
10 In an interstate study of UI recipiency Vroman and Woodbury (2004, endnote 4) find that states with
established ERP programs have shorter durations of compensated unemployment. On the technical support Web site
linked to U.S. Department of Labor’s Employment and Training Adminstration Web site (www.doleta.gov), under the
heading of “best practices,” links are provided to descriptions of ERP programs in four states—Florida, Michigan,
Tennessee, and West Virginia. Several other states also operate ERP programs. <http://www.itsc.state.md.us/
best_practices/eligibility_review_program.htm> Accessed December 13, 2004.  
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effective interventions, a result that supports WPRS and state-adopted ERPs (Klepinger et al. 1998;
Johnson and Klepinger 1991; Decker et al. 2000).10
Results from studies of targeted job search assistance are summarized in Table 7.  Evidence
from the New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment indicates that JSA targeted to dislocated
workers at risk of long-term unemployment can be a cost-effective intervention and that the
treatment can be very simple and structured; these results led directly to WPRS implementation
(Corson et al. 1989). Statistical targeting of JSA to those at risk of long-term joblessness was tested
in the District of Columbia and Florida through field experiments and offered further support for the
cost-effectiveness of targeted JSA (Decker et al. 2000).  
Recent evaluations of WPRS indicate shorter jobless durations for program participants
(Dickinson et al. 1999). An evaluation of WPRS in Kentucky, applying an experimental design,
found that WPRS shortens UI duration by more than two weeks (Black et al. 2003).  
All studies evaluating the effectiveness of the PES interventions consistently report low costs
per customer served by the public labor exchange. This fact is key to the cost-effectiveness of WIA
core services and PES interventions. Even services resulting in a modest reduction in jobless
durations show a significant return on public investment when costs are low.  Interventions that
improve linkages of UI beneficiaries to JSA have the potential to increase the efficiency of state
workforce investment systems.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The enforcement of work search requirements and the provision of reemployment services
to UI claimants can speed the return to work.  With changes in local labor markets that have resulted
in more unemployed workers having been permanently laid off without the prospect of recall, there
appears to be an increasing need for reasonable work search requirements and available job search
assistance.  
At the same time, technological developments in UI claims taking have reduced the
interaction between of the UI program staff and jobless workers, thereby reducing a monitoring
aspect of the work test and reducing personal referrals to reemployment services.  Offsetting this
trend is the universal availability of core services under the WIA system since 2000.  Another
institutional change having a countervailing impact is referral to reemployment services through the
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Service system for claimants most likely to exhaust their
entitlement to regular UI benefits. 
Two efforts now under way may shed further light on how work search requirements and
JSA affect the duration of insured unemployment: 1) Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment
(REA) programs, and 2) a Wisconsin reemployment demonstration.  Both projects strengthen work
search enforcement and linkages to reemployment services.  The REA initiative is a U.S.
Department of Labor demonstration project with a budget of $20 million to provide assistance to
states establishing new or significantly revamped REA programs.  REAs are an eligibility review
program, run within the UI program without the participation of one-stop center staff.  REA efforts
are being implemented in 21 states in 2005.  Federal funds for REAs were appropriated with the
11 See the Employment and Training Administration’s Field Memorandum No. 17-04, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2005
Unemployment Insurance (UI) Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment Grants,” dated August 12, 2004.
12 See for example: Peter Auer, Umit Efendioglu, and Janine Leschke. 2005. Active Labour Market Polices
Around the World: Coping with the consequence of globalization, Geneva: International Labour Organization.  This book
summarizes nearly 200 studies in industrialized, transition and developing countries and concludes: “All in all, as job-
search assistance is the most cost-effective measure, it should be intensively used over all phases of unemployment.”
(pp. 61-62)
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proviso that research would be conducted in the pilot states to learn if REAs can be a model for
shortening jobless durations and reducing insured unemployment.11   
Another promising approach is embodied in the ambitious Wisconsin demonstration project,
also sponsored by the Employment and Training Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor,
which brings UI and one-stop center staff together to provide reemployment services and eligibility
reviews in the one-stop center.  In this cooperative operations model, UI staff are outstationed in the
one-stop centers.  The Wisconsin demonstration, with its quasi-experimental evaluation design, will
provide further information about the cost effectiveness of such programs.
Evaluations of the UI work test and JSA summarized in this paper suggest these efforts have
tended to shorten insured durations of unemployment.  These have been cost-effective policies in
the United States.  Studies in other countries reach similar findings.  A common theme is that despite
modest response, the low cost of such interventions mean they tend to yield positive net benefits.12
The UI work test and JSA both affect UI beneficiary behavior and speed return to work.
Initiatives like the REA for reinvigorating the UI work test and studies like the Wisconsin project
investigating new linkages for UI beneficiaries to reemployment services both offer real promise for
reduced durations of insured unemployment.  In turn, such policies should help lower total measured
unemployment.
17
Table 1  Automation of the Unemployment Insurance Claims Process
Number of states by mode of UI claims taking    
Initial claims Operational Planning/implementing Other
Telephone
Internet
40
37
10
13
3
3
Continued claims Operational Planning/implementing Other
Telephone
Internet
47
29
5
18
1
6
SOURCE: Information Technology Support Center  <http://www.itsc.org/info_tech/infotech.asp>. Accessed December 13, 2004.
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Table 2  Use of Core and Intensive Employment Services, Data for the United States, Program Year 1999
Type of participants All participants UI beneficiaries
Total applicants 16,708,228 6,165,645
Received some reportable service
Referred to employment
Received job search assistance
Assessment services provided
Referred to skills training
10,943,889
6,730,492
6,707,604
1,772,910
393,980
3,415,767
1,649,816
2,428,611
659,243
174,204
SOURCE: Selected National Public Labor Exchange Data National Summary.  Accessed from
<http://www.uses.doleta.gov/arp01/appsus.asp> on December 14, 2004.
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Table 3 Provision of Core Services to All Georgia UI Clients (Sample Size = 254,030), Benefit Year Core Service
Participation, July 1, 2000 through June 30, 2001
Services Total participants Participation rate
Job referral
Order search
Job search planning
Service needs evaluation
Orientation
ERP
Specific LMI
Resume preparation
Workshops
Job search assistance
Call-in
Job development
Job finding club
Test
Bonding assistance
Profiling
CAP
75,258
128,993
66,389
82,063
67,026
66,378
157,715
16,251
50,158
52,404
15,213
14,045
196
1,331
362
41,548
59,379
0.296
0.508
0.261
0.323
0.264
0.261
0.621
0.064
0.197
0.206
0.060
0.055
0.001
0.005
0.001
0.164
0.234
Total core services 190,705 0.751
SOURCE: Georgia Department of Labor.
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Table 4 Provision of Intensive Services to All Georgia UI Clients (Sample Size = 254,030), Benefit Year Intensive
Service Participation, July 1, 2000 through June 30, 2001
Services Total participants Participation rate
Service coordination
Customer service plan
Counseling
Expanded workshop
Referral to support services
Training (includes referral only)
1,224
44,407
47,550
2,091
5,122
7,855
0.005
0.175
0.187
0.008
0.020
0.031
Total intensive services 56,340 0.222
SOURCE: Georgia Department of Labor.
Table 5  Studies on the Effectiveness of Job Interview Referrals
Authors (year published) Title Design Sample Findings
Johnson, Terry R., Katherine
P. Dickinson, Richard W.
West, Susan E. McNicoll,
Jennifer M. Pfiester, Alex L.
Stagner, and Betty J. Harris
(1983) 
A National Evaluation of the
Impact of the United States
Employment Service
P1: ES job referral
P2: Early ES job referrral  
C: Registered but received
no services
National: 
30 offices in 27 states
July 1980 to May 1981
8,000 ES applicants
P1: 23** percent earnings gain for all women, UI
claimants and non-claimants.  Nil impacts for men.
P2: Large earnings gains for women, modest earnings
gains for men.  Among men, bigger effects for men
over 45 and in urban areas.
Comments: Displacement effects possible.  Results not
affected by selectivity bias correction. Comparison
group advantaged.  
Katz, Arnold (1991)  The Length of Joblessness and
the ES with Special Reference
to Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
1979–1987. 
P1: ES placements
P2: ES job referral
C: No ES services
Pennsylvania: 
1979–1987
5% sample of UI recipients, 
16,470 jobless spells 
P1: Reductions in duration of joblessness increased
with time delay in applying for ES.  Up to !23.7**
weeks.
P2:  Reductions in duration of joblessness increased
with time delay in applying for ES.  Up to !20.5**
weeks.
Similar impacts in combination with JSA.
Comments: Control for delay in application, ES as a
backstop, JSA most effective early.
Jacobson, Louis, and Ian
Petta (2000)  
Measuring the Effect of
Public Labor Exchange (PLX)
Referrals and Placements in
Washington and Oregon.
P1: Job placements
C1: Job referrals
P2: Job referrals 
C2: Not referred
Washington: Survey of 587
during 1998 administrative
data on 328,815 spells,
1987 to mid-1995
Oregon: administrative data
on 138,280 spells during
1995.
Washington survey data:
P1: strong work record !7.2 weeks, weak work record
!3.8 weeks
Washington administrative data:
P1: !7.7 weeks.  P2: !2.1 weeks
Oregon administrative data:
P1: !4.6 weeks.  P2: !1.1 weeks
SOURCE: Christopher J O’Leary. 2004. “ Evaluating the Effectiveness of Labor Exchange Services.”  In Labor Exchange Policy in the United States, David E. Balducchi, Randall
W. Eberts, and Christopher J. O’Leary, eds. Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
NOTE: P: participant group, C: comparison group.  B/C: benefit-cost ratio.  
* (**) Statistically significant at the 90 (95) percent confidence level in a two-tailed test.
Table 6  Studies on the Effectiveness of Job Search Assistance
Authors (year published) Title Design Sample Findings
Corson, Walter, David Long and
Walter Nicholson  (1985) 
Evaluation of the Charleston
Claimant Placement and Work
Test Demonstration
T1: Stronger work test
T2: T1 plus enhanced placement
services
T3: T2 plus JSW
C: Customary work test
Charleston, SC:
February to
December 1983
T: 4,247
C: 1,428
T1:  !0.55* weeks UI 
T2:  !0.61** weeks UI
T3:  !0.76** weeks UI 
Impacts greater on men and construction
workers.
Johnson, Terry R., and Daniel
H. Klepinger (1991)
Evaluation of the Impacts of the
Washington Alternative Work
Search Experiment
T1: Exception reporting
T2: New work search policy
T3: Intensive services
C: Existing work search policy
Tacoma, WA:
July 1986 to August
1987
T: 6,763
C: 2,871
T1: +3.34** weeks UI
T2: +0.17 weeks UI
T3: !0.47* weeks UI
Exits increased preceeding required service
participation.
Klepinger, Daniel H., Terry R.
Johnson, Jutta M. Joesch, and
Jacob M. Benus (1998) 
Evaluation of the Maryland
Unemployment Insurance Work
Search Demonstration
T1: Report four employer contacts
weekly
T2: Two contacts required weekly,
but no reporting
T3: Report 2 contacts weekly plus a
4-day JSW
T4: Report two contacts weekly and
both verified  
C1: Standard policy: report two
contacts weekly but contacts not
verified
C2: Standard policy, but told data
was to be used in an evaluation
study
Maryland,
six offices
January 1, 1994 to
December 31, 1994
Combined sample:
23,758 monetarily
eligible new initial UI
claimants
T1: !0.7** weeks UI 
T2: +0.4* weeks UI
T3: !0.6** weeks UI
T4: !0.9** weeks UI
Impacts identical against either control group,
suggesting no Hawthorne Effect present.
Treatments 1, 3 and 4 had no earnings impact.  
Treatment 2 raised earnings by  4** percent.
Dolton, Peter, and Donal
O’Neill ( 2002)
Effects of Unemployment
Monitoring and Work-Search
Programs in the UK
T: Restart program in UK: Call-in
and intensive JSA after 6
continuous months on claim.
C: No Restart program, JSA after 12
months
UK Employment
Service: Inflow in
1989, tracked for five
years
T: 7,462
C: 472
T: Short term: shorter durations for both males
and females. Long term: males had
unemployment rates 6 percentage points lower
after 5 years.  No difference for females.   
SOURCE: Christopher J O’Leary. 2004. “ Evaluating the Effectiveness of Labor Exchange Services.”  In Labor Exchange Policy in the United States, David E. Balducchi, Randall
W. Eberts, and Christopher J. O’Leary, eds.  Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
NOTE: T: experimental treatment group, C: experimental control group, JSW: job search workshop; * (**) Statistically significant at the 90 (95) percent confidence level in a two-tailed
test.
Table 7  Studies on the Effectiveness of Targeted Job Search Assistance
Authors (year published) Title Design Sample Findings
Corson, Walter, Paul T. Decker,
Sherri M. Dunstan, Anne R.
Gordon, Patricia Anderson and
John Homrighausen (1989)
New Jersey Unemployment
Insurance Reemployment
Demonstration Project
T1: JSA
T2: JSA plus training or relocation
assistance
T3:  JSA plus a cash bonus
C: Eligibility: first UI payment, age,
tenure, temporary layoffs, union
New Jersey:
July 1986 to June
1987
T: 8,675
C: 2,385
T1: !0.47** weeks of UI 
T2: !0.48** weeks of UI
T3: !0.97** weeks of UI
6 Year T1: !0.76 weeks of UI
6 Year T2: !0.93 weeks of UI
6 Year T3: !1.72** weeks of UI
Decker, Paul T., Robert B.
Olson, Lance Freeman and
Daniel H. Klepinger  (2000)  
Assisting Unemployment
Insurance Claimants: The Long-
Term Impact of the Job Search
Assistance Demonstration
T1: Structured JSA 
T2: Individualized JSA 
T3: T2 plus training 
C: Not on standby or a union hiring
hall member, and predicted likely to
exhaust UI entitlement
DC and Florida
DC: June 1995 to
June 1996
8,071 claimants
FL: March 1995 to
March 1996
12,042 claimants
DC T1: !1.13** weeks of UI
DC T2: !0.47** weeks of UI
DC T3: !0.61** weeks of UI
FL T1: !0.41** weeks of UI
FL T2: !0.59** weeks of UI
FL T3: !0.52** weeks of UI
Dickinson, Katherine P., Paul T.
Decker, Suzanne D. Kreutzer,
and Richard W. West (1999)
Evaluation of Worker Profiling
and Reemployment Services:
Final Report
P: WPRS-profiled and referred to
early JSA.
C: Profiled but not referred (not on
standby or a union hiring hall
member)
CT, IL, KY, ME, NJ,
SC:
July 1995 and
December 1996.
P: 92,401
C: 295,920
CT: !0.25** weeks of UI
IL: !0.41** weeks of UI
KY: !0.21* weeks of UI
ME: !0.98** weeks of UI
NJ: !0.29** weeks of UI
SC: 0.02 weeks of UI
Black, Dan, Jeffrey Smith, Mark
Berger, and Brett Noel (2001)
Is the Threat of Reemployment
Services More Effective than the
Services Themselves? 
Experimental Evidence from the
UI System 
T: WPRS-profiled and referred to
early JSA reemployment services
C: Profiled and in the same UI
exhaustion cohort as T, but not
referred to JSA
Kentucky
October 1994 to June
1996
T: 1,236
C: 745
In the benefit year
T: !2.2 weeks of UI, 
T: !$143 in UI benefits
T:  $1,054 earnings
SOURCE: Christopher J O’Leary. 2004. “ Evaluating the Effectiveness of Labor Exchange Services.”  In Labor Exchange Policy in the United States, David E. Balducchi, Randall
W. Eberts, and Christopher J. O’Leary, eds. Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
NOTE: T: experimental treatment group, P: participant group, C: experimental control group or comparison group, JSW: job search workshop.
* (**) Statistically significant at the 90 (95) percent confidence level in a two-tailed test.  
